This is a short response piece to Moritz Cordes' 'How to arrive at Questions'. In the abstract to his paper, Cordes notes that his title is ambiguous across (at least) two readings, one regarding the correct formal syntax for questions, the other regarding the correct regulatory parameters for question-asking in a formal language. In adopting that same title for this response, I aim to offer an alternative and complementary reflection, from an explicitly informal perspective. In particular, I focus on the more salient second reading, and provide a sketch of what I take to be the correct regulatory parameters, or norms, for question-asking in informal language. In other words, I provide a sketch of the norms that guide question-asking in everyday life. I then offer some thoughts on what this means for good and virtuous questioning.

Synopsis: We speak of the right to know with relative ease. You have the right to know the results of a medical test or to be informed about the collection and use of personal data. But what exactly is the right to know, and who should we trust to safeguard it? This book provides the first comprehensive examination of the right to know and other epistemic rights: rights to goods such as information, knowledge and truth. These rights play a prominent role in our information-centric society and yet they often go unnoticed, disregarded and unprotected. As such, those who control what we know, or think we know, exert an influence on our lives that is often as dangerous as it is imperceptible. Beginning with a rigorous but accessible philosophical account of epistemic rights, Lani Watson examines the harms caused by epistemic rights violations, drawing on case studies across medical, political and legal contexts. She investigates who has the right to what information, who is responsible for the quality and circulation of information and what epistemic duties we have towards each other. This book is essential reading for philosophers, legal theorists and anyone concerned with the protection and promotion of information, knowledge and truth. Available now Reviews: "Watson makes a powerful and timely case for the adoption of a rights framework to understand and address the wrongs resulting from doubt mongering and misinformation campaigns. Written in a lucid and accessible style this book provides a defence of citizens’ right to know and of institutions and corporations’ duty to inform. It lays the groundwork for what promises to be a whole new area of inquiry." - Alessandra Tanesini, Cardiff University, UK

Questions are, in many respects, the hallmarks of the philosopher's trade. They are passed down from one generation to the next and yet, throughout history, philosophers have had relatively little to say about questions. In particular, few have asked or tried to answer the question ‘what is a question'. I call this the ‘Question Question’ and I offer an answer to it in this paper, furnishing philosophical analysis with the results of a large online survey, which has been running for more than a decade. Available here.

How does the idea that knowledge is power play out in our schools and universities. How does it feature in our education systems and how does it impact upon the intellectual characters of students. Specifically, how does the pervasiveness of this idea in our schools and classrooms affect students’ willingness and ability to be intellectually humble. In this paper, I suggest that this idea presents itself in contemporary classrooms as a barrier to the development and exercise of intellectual humility. Simply put, when we equate knowledge with power, we make it harder to be intellectually humble. In its most prevalent manifestation, this barrier arises in the form of answer-oriented education. I spend the majority of the paper outlining the nature and impact of answer-oriented education and, towards the end, suggest one way to remove this barrier by shifting from answer-oriented to question-oriented education. The latter, I argue, warrants further attention in philosophical and educational research. Download PDF here.

Epistemic rights feature both implicitly and explicitly in the highly polarized pro-life versus pro-choice abortion debate in the US. This paper explores the nature and role of epistemic rights in that debate. I argue that the proper characterisation of epistemic rights allows us to identify a range of epistemic harms perpetrated by key actors and institutions in the debate amounting to epistemic rights violations. Using two case studies, I highlight where epistemic rights arise and are violated in the abortion debate and examine the consequences of these violations for individuals and epistemic communities. I conclude that epistemic rights violations in the abortion debate harm individuals, diminish the quality of the debate and lead to increased polarization. Download PDF here.

Questioning is ubiquitous and habitual in our daily lives. We ask questions all the time, often without reflecting consciously on the practice. Sometimes it goes well, sometimes it doesn't and often we don’t notice the difference. Questions are also a familiar feature of public discourse and here the difference between good and bad questioning can have important and sometimes damaging effects: a leading question that influences the results of a referendum, a loaded question that forces a prejudicial response in public debate, the aggressive or insensitive questioning of journalists hungry for a story. In this paper I investigate what makes questioning bad (Section I) then offer a taxonomy of bad questioning practices (Section II). Drawing on examples of questioning in contemporary politics, I go on to discuss the nature and impact of bad questioning in the public sphere (Section III). I argue that bad questioning is an intellectual failing often expressed in intellectual vices such as negligence, closed-mindedness and arrogance (Section IV). As such, bad questioning in the public sphere degrades the professional character of, for example, journalists and politicians and undermines the wider role that they play in our epistemic communities. I conclude that greater attention should be paid to questioning practices in public and political forums in order to check and maintain the epistemic and characterological integrity of key social institutions (Section V). Download PDF here.

Abstract: In this paper I argue that we should rethink the dominant answer-oriented education model and educate for good questioning. I align the case in support of educating for good questioning with the democratic education movement, drawing additional support from the distinct but complementary argument for skills-based education. I present an account of the skill of good questioning and examine three distinct contributions that this skill makes to the successful functioning of democratic society, arguing that good questioning facilitates 1) understanding, 2) participation, and 3) decision-making. Good questioning is thereby conducive to both individual learning and societal cohesion and is a key component of intellectual character, without which learning is in danger of becoming passive and compliant. Good questioning serves the aims of democratic education and, correspondingly, of democracy itself. We should educate for good questioning in democratic society. Download the PDF here.

Abstract: One natural application of Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory (EMT) is found in the context of moral and intellectual character education. Zagzebski discusses this application in her recent book, commenting that ‘exemplars can serve as a guide for moral training’ (p. 129) and endorsing ‘the learning of virtue by imitation’ (p. 129). This theme has been pursued compellingly by authors working at the intersection of virtue ethics and education, contributing to an emerging case for exemplarist-based approaches to character education. I focus on intellectual character education and draw attention to an interesting case in which exemplarism in the classroom may be seen to inhibit, rather than promote, the development of intellectually virtuous character. This is the case of virtuous inquisitiveness. Download the PDF here.

Abstract: This review essay provides a critical discussion of Linda Zagzebski’s (2017) Exemplarist Moral Theory (EMT). We agree that EMT is a book of impressive scope that will be of interest to ethical theorists, as well as epistemologists, philosophers of language, and philosophers of religion. We argue that exemplarism faces a number of important challenges, firstly, in dealing with the fallibility of admiration, which plays a central role in the theoretical framework, and secondly, in serving as a practical guide for moral development. Despite this, we maintain that EMT points the way for significant future theoretical and empirical research into some of the most well-established questions in ethical theory.

What was the last question that you asked. Take a moment to recall. Perhaps it was in conversation with a friend or colleague. Perhaps to a stranger in a café or a shop. Maybe you conducted a search in Google or wondered to yourself which article in The Philosophers’ Magazine to read next. Can you recall precisely what you asked, who you asked, or how you asked it. Read more…

Recently I was handed a small black card by a stranger in the street. It read: ‘SIMPLE QUESTION! Where will YOU spend eternity?’ The card also displayed a website and a QR code, presumably for those wishing to seek out an answer. I haven’t visited the website yet but the card did get me thinking. Read more…

Abstract: In this paper, I outline the nature of epistemic rights and epistemic rights violations (Sections I-III) and demonstrate the widespread perpetration of such violations in pre-Brexit media coverage (Section IV). This provides a case study for the investigation of epistemic rights violations across national and international media; a topic of central concern for contemporary epistemology (Section V). Download the PDF here.

Abstract: My aim, in this chapter, is to present a characterisation of the intellectual virtue of curiosity that offers some insight into educating for the virtue, and provides theoretically grounded motivations for doing so. I begin by outlining a characterisation of curiosity as an intellectual virtue. I then examine three key features of this characterisation relevant to the task of educating for curiosity as an intellectual virtue. Finally, I present, what I take to be two of the most compelling reasons to educate for the intellectual virtue of curiosity. Download the PDF here.

Abstract: This paper offers characterisations of the intellectual virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness and discusses the distinction between them. I argue that curiosity and inquisitiveness should not be regarded as synonymous. Specifically, virtuous inquisitiveness emerges as a restricted form of virtuous curiosity: it is virtuous curiosity manifested as good questioning. This has implications, within applied virtue epistemology, for the ways in which we educate for these closely related, but distinct intellectual virtues. Download the PDF here.

Abstract: In this paper, I present a central line of argument in support of educating for good questioning, namely, that it plays an important role in the formation of an individual’s intellectual character and can thereby serve as a valuable pedagogical tool for intellectual character education. I argue that good questioning plays two important roles in the cultivation of intellectual character: good questioning 1) stimulates intellectually virtuous inquiry and 2) contributes to the development of several of the individual intellectual virtues. Insofar as the cultivation of intellectually virtuous character is a desirable educational objective, we should educate for good questioning. Download the PDF here.

Abstract: The landscape of contemporary epistemology has significantly diversified in the past thirty years, shaped in large part by two complementary movements; virtue and social epistemology. This diversification provides an apt theoretical context for the epistemology of education. No longer concerned exclusively with the formal analysis of knowledge, epistemologists have turned their attention towards individuals as knowers, and the social contexts in which epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding are acquired and exchanged. As such the concerns of epistemology have once again aligned with questions lying at the heart of the philosophy of education regarding the nature, aims and practice of education. Employing the conceptual tools and frameworks of the contemporary field, these questions are addressed by both epistemologists and education theorists in the emerging epistemology of education literature. Download the PDF here.

Abstract: Inquisitiveness is a paradigm example of an intellectual virtue. Despite some extensive work on the characterisation of the intellectual virtues, however, (e.g. Roberts and Wood, 2007; Baehr 2011) no detailed treatment of the virtue of inquisitiveness has been forthcoming in the recent literature. This paper offers a characterisation of virtuous inquisitiveness considered within the framework of educating for intellectual virtue. It presents the case in support of educating for inquisitiveness arguing that it is a primary intellectual virtue to educate for. Download the PDF here.

Abstract: This paper offers an in-depth examination of the intellectual virtue of inquisitiveness. A characterisation of inquisitiveness is developed in Part I in which the inquisitive person is identified as one who is characteristically motivated to engage sincerely in good questioning. Part II examines the place of inquisitiveness among the virtues. Inquisitiveness is seen to bear a defining relationship to the process of inquiry as a fundamentally motivating intellectual virtue. On this basis, it is argued that inquisitiveness plays a distinctively valuable role in the intellectually virtuous life, placing it at the heart of autonomous virtue epistemology. Download the PDF here.

Coming soon...

'What is a Question', Philosophy Club, St Paul’s School 'Questions and P4C', Scottish Learning Festival, Glasgow 'Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them', Edinburgh Legal Theory Group, University of Edinburgh 'The Social Virtue of Questioning', Civic Virtues Conference, University of Nottingham (Keynote) 'Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them', Philosophy Speaker Series, Queen’s University Belfast 'Vices of Questioning in Public Discourse', Epistemic Vices Conference, University of Liverpool (Keynote) ‘Questioning and P4C’, Advanced P4C Seminar, University of Winchester. ​ ‘Vices of Questioning in Public Discourse’, Vice Epistemology Conference, University of Connecticut. ​ ‘Questions and Power’, Language and Power Workshop, University of Connecticut. ​ 'Knowledge is Power’: Barriers to Intellectual Humility in the Classroom’, Fellows’ Talk, University of Connecticut. ​ ‘What are Epistemic Rights and when are they violated’, Social Epistemology Working Group, University of Connecticut.

‘What are Epistemic Rights’, Social Epistemology Network Meeting, University of Oslo. ​ ‘Educating for Curiosity’, SPECS Workshop, University of Edinburgh. ​ ‘The Right to Know and the Right to Ask’, Political Polarization and Epistemic Arrogance, Humility and Conviction in Public Life conference, University of Connecticut, CT, US. ​ ‘Curiosity: An Epistemic Emotion’ World Congress of Philosophy, Peking University. ​ ‘The Epistemology of Education’ World Congress of Philosophy, Peking University. ​ 'Knowledge is Power’: Barriers to Intellectual Humility in the Classroom and what we can do to remove them’, Virtue Epistemology Conference, University of Glasgow. ​ ‘Virtue and Vice in the Media’, Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues annual conference, University of Oxford, UK.

‘The Epistemology of Education: A Role for Questioning and Inquisitiveness.’ Presentation tour: Nihon University, University of Hiroshima, University of Kyoto, and Sofia University, Japan ​ ‘Vices of Questioning in Public Discourse’, Changing Attitudes in Public Discourse conference, University of Cardiff, UK. ​ ‘The Problem with Educating for Inquisitiveness by Example’, Aretai Centre, University of Genoa, Italy. ​ ‘What are Epistemic Rights and When are they Violated’, Epistemic vice and corruption workshop, University of Nottingham, UK. ​ ‘Educating for Inquisitiveness by Example’, Bled Philosophical Conference, Bled, Slovenia. ​ ‘Systematic Epistemic Rights Violations in the Media: A Brexit Case Study’, Joint Session, University of Edinburgh, UK. ​ 'Why We Should Educate for Inquisitiveness in a Democracy’, Beacon Project Workshop, Wake Forest University, SC, US. ​ ‘Systematic Epistemic Rights Violations in the Media: A Brexit Case Study’, Virtue Epistemology Conference, University of Oklahoma, OK, US.

‘Why We Should Educate for Inquisitiveness in a Democracy’, Values and Leadership in Education Conference, Western University, Ontario, Canada. ​ ‘Why We Should Educate for Questioning’, series of invited lectures, University of New Mexico, University of Oklahoma, and Loyola Marymount University, USA. ​ ‘Educating for Inquisitiveness’, Disagreement and Education Workshop, National University of Singapore, Singapore.

‘Asking Virtuous Questions: Perspectives from Indian Philosophy’, Indian Philosophy Workshop, University of Durham, UK. ​ ‘Knowledge is a Questioning-Relative State: A virtue-based contrastive account’, Virtue Epistemology Conference, KU Leuven, Belgium. ​ ‘Virtuous Questioning’, Virtuous Adversariality Conference, University of Durham, UK.

‘What is a Question’, Philosophy ThinkTank, University of Edinburgh, UK.Watch a video of this public presentation where I present some empirical results from my questionnaire exploring what a question is. ​ ‘The Value of Questioning in Applied Epistemology’, Language and Epistemology Workshop, Yonsei University, South Korea. ​ ‘Why Should Philosophers Study Questioning’, Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Conference, University of Oxford, UK. ​ ‘Why Should Philosophers Study Questioning’, Intellectual Virtues, Group Knowledge and Education workshop, University of Edinburgh, UK.

‘A Theory of Good Questioning’, Edinburgh Epistemology Workshop, University of Edinburgh, UK. Watch a video of this presentation where I presented some of my preliminary theoretical considerations concerning good questioning. ​ ‘Why Should We Educate For Inquisitiveness’, Educating for Intellectual Virtues, Loyola Marymount University, USA.

‘The Value of Questions: Third Time Lucky’, Edinburgh Epistemology Workshop, University of Edinburgh, UK. ​ ‘Questions of Epistemic Value’, Understanding Value, University of Sheffield, UK. ​ ‘The Virtue of Inquiring’, Aims of Inquiry and Cognition workshop, University of Edinburgh, UK. ​ ‘Questions of Epistemic Value’, Work-In-Progress Seminar, University of Edinburgh, UK.

‘The Value of Questions: Revisited’, Edinburgh Epistemology workshop, University of Edinburgh, UK.

‘The Value of Questions’, Edinburgh Epistemology workshop, University of Edinburgh, UK.

What is a Question and why does it matter. Royal Institute of Philosophy Public Lecture Series. Scheduled for 28 Feb 2020.

‘What is a Question’ an interview for the ‘Choose To Be Curious’ podcast with Lynn Borton at Arlington Independent Media. Listen to the 30 minute interview here! Question First. Training and consultancy for Royal Zoological Society Scotland. Question First. Training workshops for the Moray House School of Education JESIE summer school for visiting Chinese students. Question First. Training and consultancy for Scottish Opera. The Art of Questioning – Four part column for The Philosopher: A Public Philosophy Journal.

What is a Question – Short piece for The Philosopher’s Magazine. Questioning the Questions – Short piece for The Philosopher: A Public Philosophy Journal. Download the PDF here.

)Ongoing) OPEN-Scotland.com – I coordinate OPEN Scotland: An Online Philosophy and Education Network for Scotland. The network aims to provide access to training, resources, events and an online community for anyone interested in promoting the quality and quantity of philosophy in Scottish schools and communities. The network has been supported by Knowledge Exchange and Impact Grants from the University of Edinburgh and the Eidyn Research Centre. Curiosity Forest – Public presentation as part of the European Commission’s Explorathon Night.

‘How are the children’ and ‘What is Justice’ engagement events – Participated as a postdoctoral fellow in outreach events organised by the Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing, in collaboration with Oklahoma City based organisations SALLT and Thriving Cities. Philosophy in Schools – Philosophy sessions with 11-13 year-olds, conducted at Firrhill Secondary School, Edinburgh.

Philosophy ThinkTank – A philosophical public engagement event hosted by the University of Edinburgh. Watch the presentation here. Children’s University – A workshop introducing primary school children to philosophical ideas and methods, held in collaboration with the Children’s University Trust at Stoneyhill Primary School in Edinburgh. Philosophy in the Playground – An interactive philosophy workshop for parents with young children, run by the University of Edinburgh’s Eidyn Research Centre at Summerhall Arts Centre in Edinburgh.

Three-Minute Thesis Competition – An international public engagement competition for PhD students in all disciplines in which I was the University of Edinburgh’s second place finalist. Watch the presentation here. ‘Create a Philosophy TimeTree’ – An interactive philosophy workshop for undergraduates, designed and run for Innovative Learning Week at the University of Edinburgh. Contributing author for 1001 Ideas That Changed The Way We Think. Quintessence Publishing.

Philosophy in Schools Training – Stage 1 of the Philosophy Foundation’s philosophy in schools training. ‘Timelining Session’ – An interactive philosophy workshop for undergraduates, designed and run for Innovative Learning Week at the University of Edinburgh.

Questions are, in many respects, the hallmarks of the philosopher's trade. They are passed down from one generation to the next and yet, throughout history, philosophers have had relatively little to say about questions. In particular, few have asked or tried to answer the question ‘what is a question'. I call this the ‘Question Question’ and I offer an answer to it in this paper, furnishing philosophical analysis with the results of a large online survey, which has been running for more than a decade. Available here.

How does the idea that knowledge is power play out in our schools and universities. How does it feature in our education systems and how does it impact upon the intellectual characters of students. Specifically, how does the pervasiveness of this idea in our schools and classrooms affect students’ willingness and ability to be intellectually humble. In this paper, I suggest that this idea presents itself in contemporary classrooms as a barrier to the development and exercise of intellectual humility. Simply put, when we equate knowledge with power, we make it harder to be intellectually humble. In its most prevalent manifestation, this barrier arises in the form of answer-oriented education. I spend the majority of the paper outlining the nature and impact of answer-oriented education and, towards the end, suggest one way to remove this barrier by shifting from answer-oriented to question-oriented education. The latter, I argue, warrants further attention in philosophical and educational research. Download PDF here.

Abstract: In this paper I argue that we should rethink the dominant answer-oriented education model and educate for good questioning. I align the case in support of educating for good questioning with the democratic education movement, drawing additional support from the distinct but complementary argument for skills-based education. I present an account of the skill of good questioning and examine three distinct contributions that this skill makes to the successful functioning of democratic society, arguing that good questioning facilitates 1) understanding, 2) participation, and 3) decision-making. Good questioning is thereby conducive to both individual learning and societal cohesion and is a key component of intellectual character, without which learning is in danger of becoming passive and compliant. Good questioning serves the aims of democratic education and, correspondingly, of democracy itself. We should educate for good questioning in democratic society. Download the PDF here.

Abstract: One natural application of Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory (EMT) is found in the context of moral and intellectual character education. Zagzebski discusses this application in her recent book, commenting that ‘exemplars can serve as a guide for moral training’ (p. 129) and endorsing ‘the learning of virtue by imitation’ (p. 129). This theme has been pursued compellingly by authors working at the intersection of virtue ethics and education, contributing to an emerging case for exemplarist-based approaches to character education. I focus on intellectual character education and draw attention to an interesting case in which exemplarism in the classroom may be seen to inhibit, rather than promote, the development of intellectually virtuous character. This is the case of virtuous inquisitiveness. Download the PDF here.

What was the last question that you asked. Take a moment to recall. Perhaps it was in conversation with a friend or colleague. Perhaps to a stranger in a café or a shop. Maybe you conducted a search in Google or wondered to yourself which article in The Philosophers’ Magazine to read next. Can you recall precisely what you asked, who you asked, or how you asked it. Read more…

Recently I was handed a small black card by a stranger in the street. It read: ‘SIMPLE QUESTION! Where will YOU spend eternity?’ The card also displayed a website and a QR code, presumably for those wishing to seek out an answer. I haven’t visited the website yet but the card did get me thinking. Read more…

Abstract: My aim, in this chapter, is to present a characterisation of the intellectual virtue of curiosity that offers some insight into educating for the virtue, and provides theoretically grounded motivations for doing so. I begin by outlining a characterisation of curiosity as an intellectual virtue. I then examine three key features of this characterisation relevant to the task of educating for curiosity as an intellectual virtue. Finally, I present, what I take to be two of the most compelling reasons to educate for the intellectual virtue of curiosity. Download the PDF here.

Abstract: In this paper, I present a central line of argument in support of educating for good questioning, namely, that it plays an important role in the formation of an individual’s intellectual character and can thereby serve as a valuable pedagogical tool for intellectual character education. I argue that good questioning plays two important roles in the cultivation of intellectual character: good questioning 1) stimulates intellectually virtuous inquiry and 2) contributes to the development of several of the individual intellectual virtues. Insofar as the cultivation of intellectually virtuous character is a desirable educational objective, we should educate for good questioning. Download the PDF here.

Abstract: Inquisitiveness is a paradigm example of an intellectual virtue. Despite some extensive work on the characterisation of the intellectual virtues, however, (e.g. Roberts and Wood, 2007; Baehr 2011) no detailed treatment of the virtue of inquisitiveness has been forthcoming in the recent literature. This paper offers a characterisation of virtuous inquisitiveness considered within the framework of educating for intellectual virtue. It presents the case in support of educating for inquisitiveness arguing that it is a primary intellectual virtue to educate for. Download the PDF here.